This article will discuss the contribution of Halford John Mackinder, one of the earliest and most influential of the contributors to the discussion. Around the young geographer, Halford J. Mackinder, grew concerned with the changing balance of international power. He argued that. This largely outdated view influenced some geopolitical thinking. Sir Halford John Mackinder was a British geographer who wrote a paper in.
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At Oxford, Mackinder was the driving force behind the creation of a School of Geography in Conventional wisdom recommended countering every Soviet move, no mackindeg how trivial. Retrieved from ” https: Whilst the Heartland Theory initially received little attention outside geography, this theory would later exercise some influence on the foreign policies of world powers.
Halford Mackinder | British political geographer |
Mackinder himself became a full professor in Geography in the University of London London School of Economics in Mackinder might have been mackinfer first strategist in history to suggest that the surrounded have the advantage. The role of Britain and the United States, he considered, was to preserve a balance between the powers contending for control of the heartland. Archived from the original PDF on 8 March His Machiavellian approach was infamously devoid of ideology gfopolitics “sentimentality”and as such caused the term geopolitics to fall out of favor with many of the foreign policy practitioners who followed.
Appleton and company, A modern army, should it want to attack the Heartland, would have little trouble bypassing “Lenaland,” or slicing right through Central Asia. Surely he is correct when he points out that “it mattered enormously” that the Falklands were islands and Kuwait a gfopolitics, and geography still has a great impact upon military tactics and how battles are fought.
Mackinder, The geographical pivot of history. Geographical JournalVol.
Ironically, the real reason behind the ability of the Heartland to resist attack also guarantees that it will never be able to live up to Mackinder’s forecast. Chess has two players, and one geooplitics it is zero-sum, and to the finish; there is a winner and a mackindrr, with no middle ground. The only way that the next century can be better than the one we are leaving is with a reevaluation of the assumptions and attitudes that underlie our actions.
Spykman, considered one of the leading intellectual forefathers of containment, speculated about power projection into and out of the Heartland. We welcome suggested improvements to any of our articles.
The World Island is still the central focus of US policy, and the Russians are still considered to have the most fortunate position on the map. The movement envisions the Eurasian heartland as the geographic launching pad for a global anti-Western movement whose goal is the ultimate expulsion of “Atlantic” read: The analogy with haford World Island and the United States falls apart, for no nation that dominates that continent would ever be able to threaten our hemisphere.
Mackinder served as President of the Oxford Union in If we approach Eurasia as if it were a chessboard, then we will be met by opponentsand cooperation and mutual benefit would be removed from our calculations.
The Geographical Pivot of History
His fields are international relations and comparative politics, and his dissertation addresses US foreign policy toward Central Asia and the Caspian Sea. Sometimes we fail to perceive the end of that intellectual shelf life. Indeed, many policymakers came from the world of academia, where they were certainly exposed to Mackinder’s geopolitical theories.
The greatest natural fortress on earth is certainly vulnerable to 21st-century weaponry, offering little inherent advantage to the power within. To understand the appeal of formal geopolitics to certain intellectuals, institutions, and would-be strategists, one has to appreciate the mythic qualities of geopolitics. Mackinder in the early 20th century as the key to world domination in an era of declining importance for traditionally invincible sea power.
Rather than providing a heightened security, this position actually heightens the Heartland’s insecurity. The book’s most famous quote was: The latter opinion was strengthened, of course, by Germany’s eventual defeat.
Even its most seemingly impenetrable boundary, the Polar Sea, offers little protection from attack from the sky by planes and missiles. Whereas Mackinder assumed that geographical formations made for easiest access from the east, Spykman argued that the littoral areas of the Heartland, or what he called the “Rimland,” was key to controlling the center.
To head off any return to empire, many feel that the West must be firm in discouraging a growth in Russian influence in the new states. We still are not able to understand that the quest for empire in Russian history is at least in part an attempt to bolster the insecurity that its position has always entailed.
While Mackinder’s warnings of the advantages inherent in central positioning on the Eurasian landmass certainly became incorporated into Cold War American strategic thought and policy, some observers seem to believe that the principle architects of US foreign policy throughout the Cold War era must have been carrying Mackinder in their briefcases. In the House, Mackinder did not make a strong impact. Simon Dalby, “American Security Discourse: The inability to understand the other’s view is one of the great historical features of US foreign policy.
The essential irrelevance of the “natural defenses” of the Heartland was pointed out during the first stages of debate on Mackinder during World War II.
Please help to improve this article by introducing more precise citations. Strangely, though, Mackinder received a fresh look by some scholars in the s, both in the United States and abroad, and especially in the Heartland itself.
The idea that a Heartland power has any advantages due to its position on the map cannot be historically or theoretically justified; the notion that an imbalance of power in Eurasia even if it were conceivable would somehow threaten the interests of the United States is not tenable; and the idea that geographic “realities” of power can operate outside of the context of ideology, nationalism, and culture is pure fantasy.
Inhe published Britain and the British Seaswhich included the first comprehensive geomorphology of the British Isles and which became a classic in regional geography.
It does not appear true that the Eastern Hemisphere bestows any strategic advantage over the Western.
Halford Mackinder – Wikipedia
Brzezinski has made Eurasia the focus for US foreign policy in all of his writing, consistently warning of the dangerous advantages that the Heartland power had over the West. The geographical boundaries of the Heartland, to the extent that they were ever obstacles, would have hampered any attempt to use it as a springboard for hemispheric dominance. Mackinder was anti- Bolshevikand as British High Commissioner in Southern Russia in late and earlyduring the Russian Civil War, he stressed the need for Britain to continue her support to the White Russian forces, which he attempted to unite.
This belief traces its roots directly back to Sir Halford Mackinder and his theories of the Heartland. Thus, who ruled the Heartland would have the possibility of commanding the entire World Island.