The rediscovery of the mind / John R. Searle. p. cm. – (Representation and mind). “A Bradford book.” Includes bibliographical references and. Abraham Witonsky, Georges Rey, Contemporary Philosophy of Mind: A Contentiously Classical Approach, Contemporary Philosophy Series, Minds and . John R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge, Mass., and. London: MIT, a Bradford Book, 1. Introduction. In this remarkable work, the author.

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The “rediscovery” is also likely to pass unnoticed. In this major new work, John Searle launches a formidable attack on current orthodoxies in the philosophy of mind.

The Rediscovery of the Mind (Representation and Mind)

Likewise, if something is subjective, then it is not objective; if something is objective, then it is not subjective. Searle believes that the vocabulary being used in the field is a source of a whole lot of confusion. To the extent Searle is right that the seven materialist accounts of mind discussed do in fact ignore or eliminate subjectivity from their accounts of mind, he seems right to conclude that they jjohn all therefore inadequate.

Easy to read, and he does a great job conveying his thoughts clearly and with humor. If that amounts to having your cake and eating it too, let’s eat. Amazon Renewed Refurbished products with a warranty.

Given the looseness with which Searle rejects Cartesian dualism in mibd book, I would throw The Rediscovery of the Mind into the literature Robinson refers to. I do not know the origin of this phrase, but it is probably derived from Ogden and Richards’s characterization of Watson as “affecting general anaesthesia”p.


Scientific American Library, W. This passed unnoticed by society at large. I was enjoying my summer making good money, preparing for my second year at the good ol’ UofM. It is not the given.

Peter Carruthers – – Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 2: But for an explicit statement, see Georges Rey Reeiscovery is an interesting fact that in three recent books seaele of which contain the word “consciousness” in their titles – Paul Churchland’s Matter and Conscious-nessRay Jackendoff’s Consciousness and the Computational Mindand William Lycan’s Consciousness – there is little or no effort to give any account of or theory of consciousness.

I have benefited over a period of several years from discus-sions and conversations with friends, students, and colleagues about the issues considered in this book. As such, Searle’s claim becomes a claim that I simply do not have the power to evaluate.

There is one qualification to this point. I’m actually torn regarding the strength of his arguments against computation. All these “isms” are mistaken, he insists. This makes me extremely nervous, because it is always possible that I might be misunderstanding them as badly as they misunderstand me.

Some are philosophical or psychological or part of cognitive science generally. I do not believe that Searle would take his criticism of our vocabulary so far as to say we are wrong to think circles and squares are mutually exclusive.


What’s Wrong with the Philosophy of Mind. Behavior or causal relations to behavior are not essential to the existence of mental phenomena. Once we have gone beyond both materialism and dualism, how do we locate consciousness in. The conceptual problem I have in mind is this: Some Arguments for the Hypothesis of the Background. He would say that my inability to merge these two terms together is a product of my inheriting a traditional vocabulary or set of conceptual categories from the last several hundred years of philosophical thought that is almost certainly false.

If that is true, though, on what grounds should I suppose that “subjective” and “objective,” “body” and “mind,” or “physical” and “mental” are not likewise mutually exclusive?

The Rediscovery of the Mind by John Rogers Searle

The physical body, fhe to dualism, exists “on its own” without any dependence on the mind; likewise, according to dualism, the mind exists “on its own” without any dependence on the body. Amazon Rapids Fun stories for kids on the go. The Relationship Between Mindreading and Metacognition.